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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fruits of the Human Genome Project (HGP) will soon 
enable people to have simple tests that provide information about 
their genetic propensities for various disorders, both mental and 
physical. This new information could thus give people the ability to 
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make important decisions related to their health; however, it could 
also result in misinterpretation and misuse by others, such as 
employers.  Ongoing legal and ethical debates suggest that 
information about people’s genetic propensities could result in 
discrimination, with commentators disagreeing over how effective 
current jurisprudence is for preventing and/or remediating such 
violations.  This debate begs fundamental questions that 
psychological research could address, such as “Would employers 
even utilize genetic information, should they gain access to it?”  
This article reviews relevant literature on genetics and disability 
discrimination and outlines some psycho-legal issues and avenues 
for research. 
II. GENETIC INFORMATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT:  
A PSYCHO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
The desire to make inferences about human nature based on 
biology is not without precedent or merit.  History is rife with 
examples of attempts to categorize and predict human diseases and 
behaviors, both for good purposes (e.g., to improve health) and for 
bad (e.g., eugenics, which sought to “weed out the weak”).1  The 
Human Genome Project (HGP) is the newest in a series of 
technological improvements that will allow us to persist in efforts to 
improve ourselves.  Proponents of the HGP argue that it will allow 
us to identify the genetic mutations that cause disease and 
unhealthiness and ultimately remedy those problems.2  However, 
past experience demonstrates that we sometimes place more faith 
in the conclusiveness and accuracy of our latest technology than is 
warranted.3 
For example, during the eugenics movement of the early 
twentieth century, people with low cognitive functioning were often 
 
 1. David L.Wiesenthal & Neil I. Wiener, Privacy and the Human Genome 
Project, 6 ETHICS & BEHAV. 189 (1996). 
 2. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins & Victor A. McKusick, Implications of the Human 
Genome Project for Medical Science, 285 JAMA 540, 543-44 (2001); Florian Eckhardt et 
al., Future Potential of the Human Epigenome Project, 4(5) EXPERT REV. OF MOLECULAR 
DIAGNOSIS 609 (2004) (discussing epigenetics and its usefulness in diagnosing the 
molecular basis of human diseases). 
 3. Sarah Cunningham-Burley & Mary Boulton, The Social Context of the New 
Genetics, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL STUDIES IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 173, 174-75 
(Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2000) (discussing a social context analysis of genetic 
developments as well as a sociohistorical overview of the growth of genetics during 
the twentieth century). 
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sterilized because they were seen as incapable of caring for 
children and their intellectual limitations were seen as unworthy 
traits.4  Contradicting these assumptions, research from the latter 
half of the twentieth century demonstrates that many people with 
low cognitive functioning can raise children with the aid of social 
support and skills training.5  For another example, males with an 
extra Y chromosome (XYY chromosomes instead of XY 
chromosomes) were argued to be more likely to be mentally ill, 
aggressive and criminal;6 it is now recognized that many of the 
studies leading to those conclusions suffered from bias in sampling 
techniques, among other problems.7  Based on history, it seems 
prudent to be cautious when interpreting new information that 
purports to link heredity to behavioral outcomes in a conclusive 
way, because two risks exist: (1) that the information will be 
inaccurate or misinterpreted,8 or (2) that the information will be 
accurate and understood, but misused. 
Already, advances in our understanding of the genetic 
precursors for heritable diseases have led to new genetic tests.9  For 
example, one can now obtain a test for cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs 
Disease, hereditary breast and colon cancer, coronary artery 
disease, late-onset Alzheimer’s, bipolar disorder, multiple sclerosis, 
 
 4. See J. David Smith & Edward A. Polloway, Institutionalization, Involuntary 
Sterilization, and Mental Retardation: Profiles From the History of the Practice, 31 MENTAL 
RETARDATION 208, 208 (1993) (discussing the legitimization of sterilization and 
quoting Justice Holmes from Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)); Frederick E. 
Kratter, Negative and Positive Eugenic Programs for Mental Defectives, 63 J. OF GEN. 
PSYCHOL. 203, 204, 207-08 (1960) (advocating selective sterilization). 
 5. See, e.g., Maurice A. Feldman et al., Using Self-Instructional Pictorial Manuals 
to Teach Child-Care Skills to Mothers With Intellectual Disabilities, 23 BEHAV. 
MODIFICATION 480, 481 (1999). 
 6. See, e.g., Lissy F. Jarvik et al., Human Aggression and the Extra Y Chromosome: 
Fact or Fantasy? 28 AM. PSYCHOL. 674, 675 (1973). 
 7. See, e.g., Nkanginieme Ike, Current Thinking on XYY Syndrome, 30 
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 91, 92-93 (2000). 
 8. Richard S. Cooper, Race and IQ: Molecular Genetics as Deus ex Machina, 60 
AM. PSYCHOL. 71 (2005); see generally Norman B. Anderson & Kim J. Nickerson, 
Genes, Race, and Psychology in the Genome Era: An Introduction, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 5 
(2005) (stating that with the advance of the HGP, the field needs to understand 
the issues and implications of the research); Ainsley Newson, The Nature and 
Significance of Behavioral Genetic Information, 25 THEORETICAL MED. 89 (2004) 
(discussing how behavioral genetic information is distinguished from other 
genetic information). 
 9. See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho et al., Commercialization of BRCA1/2 Testing: 
Practitioner Awareness and Use of a New Genetic Test, 83 AM. J. OF MED. GENETICS 157 
(1999). 
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Parkinson’s and schizophrenia—which are just some of the 
available tests.10  Advances in genetic testing, as a result of new 
technological and scientific breakthroughs derived from the HGP, 
may lead to a new form of employment discrimination based on 
the perception of the increased likelihood of disease occurrence 
from tests assessing genetic susceptibility.  For example, employers 
may be concerned about the future costs of an employee who has 
tested positive on a genetic test.  These perceived future costs could 
take the form of lost time/absenteeism, lost productivity, higher 
turnover, and expensive accommodations.11  Employment 
discrimination would follow if employers decided to control these 
perceived future costs by not hiring people who tested positive for 
disorders. 
David Wiesenthal and Neil Wiener12 outline the way previous 
scientific advances in understanding the biochemical nature of 
humans has indeed been used to make biological and behavioral 
inferences, often in a discriminating manner (such as the 
aforementioned example of believing that having the chromosomal 
abnormality XYY predicted pathologically violent behavior).  They 
predict that the likelihood of this type of genetic information 
misuse is likely to continue in the new era of genetic information 
availability.13  They also suggest that the pressure to make use of the 
available information will become increasingly strong, citing the 
“Law of the Hammer” which states, “[O]nce a tool is developed 
there are considerable pressures for implementation.”14  
The wealth of general knowledge resulting from the HGP will 
provide the opportunity for individualized health information to be 
obtained through simple medical tests (e.g., blood tests) in a way 
that will make the diagnostic information seem more concrete and 
dispositive than previous technology.  The air of determinism that 
might be associated with the availability of this new type of health 
information could have serious, deleterious consequences if it is 
misinterpreted, over-interpreted, and/or misused (e.g., for 
purposes of potentially unlawful discrimination). 
 
 10. Paula W. Yoon et al., Public Health Impact of Genetic Tests at the End of the 20th 
Century, 3 GENETICS IN MED. 405, 405 (2001). 
 11. Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Genetic Discrimination and the 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Emerging Legal, Empirical, 
and Policy Implications, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411, 421 (1996). 
 12. See Wiesenthal & Wiener, supra note 1. 
 13. See id. at 196-98. 
 14. Id. at 196. 
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The history of interpreting traits as being strongly determined 
by heredity demonstrates our inability to account for 
environmental influences that may alter outcomes.15  The reality is 
that many genes operate according to a diathesis-stress model 
whereby “disease” is not expressed unless an environmental stressor 
“activates” the gene expression.  For example, one may have a 
genetic predisposition (the diathesis) for schizophrenia, but 
whether or not a given person develops schizophrenia will depend 
on many different environmental factors (the stressors) that could 
bring it about.16  Thus, there are a number of considerations, aside 
from the mere presence of a positive genetic test, that need to be 
accounted for when one tries to interpret the risk of genetic 
expression and make decisions (e.g., health-related behaviors or 
hiring decisions) based on that interpretation.  Incorrectly making 
decisions about people’s propensities for genetic expression of 
disorders could lead to unfair assumptions about their future 
health and result in discriminatory treatment. 
Concern about the misuse of health information and the 
rights of ordinary citizens is warranted and not without precedent.  
Employers have used a range of techniques varying in intrusiveness 
to evaluate potential employees, from simple personality tests to 
physiological tests (blood or urine) to rule out drug abuse.  Case 
law examples demonstrate that employers have been willing to use 
permissible drug tests to obtain illegal information about medical 
conditions of current and potential employees in making hiring 
and dismissal decisions.17  There is a heated debate in legal 
literature regarding whether existing legislation would protect job 
applicants and employees from genetic discrimination.18  However, 
even if employers have permissible access to employees’ and 
applicants’ medical information, decisions based on genetic tests 
are unfounded to the degree that most of them currently offer no 
 
 15. See Cunningham-Burley & Boulton, supra note 3, at 178. 
 16. See, e.g., Elaine F. Walker & Donald Diforio, Schizophrenia: A Neutral 
Diathesis-Stress Model, 104 PSYCHOL. REV. 667 (1997). 
 17. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (involving governmental employer who conditioned start of 
employment upon a “health evaluation” that included testing for medical and 
genetic information such as syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy). 
 18. Cynthia Nance et al., Discrimination in Employment on the Basis of Genetics: 
Proceedings of the 2002 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on 
Employment Discrimination Law, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 57 (2002) (Panel 
discussion of existing legislation’s applicability to genetic discrimination). 
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diagnostic value in the evaluation of future job performance.  As 
Blanck and Marti19 indicate, genetic precursors to a disease do not 
necessarily confirm that a disease will arise in the future, much less 
how severe the expression of the disease will be.  Single gene 
diseases are rare; the majority of diseases are explained by the 
multiple interactions of several genes and the environment.20  
Furthermore, diseases have the potential to be ameliorated by a 
number of environmental factors, such as behavior modification 
(i.e., engaging in healthy activities) or medical treatment programs; 
but employers, as well as medical professionals, may place an over-
emphasis on genetic predetermination and consequently ignore 
environmental factors.21 
This article reviews literature relevant to the topic of genetic 
information misinterpretation and misuse, particularly in the 
employment context.  More specifically, it will briefly review 
relevant legislation and examples from case law of genetic and 
health-based discrimination.22  Next, literature on people’s 
knowledge of the HGP, perceptions about testing, and genetic 
discrimination will be reviewed.23  Since there is little empirical 
examination of actual genetic discrimination, the related literature 
of disability discrimination will be briefly reviewed.24  The focus of 
the article is the potential for use of genetic information in an 
employment decision-making context; thus, consideration will be 
given to the literature on how employers (or more often, potential 
employers engaged in hiring) make decisions.  The article 
culminates in a call for research that empirically examines whether 
health-based information, such as genetic test results, would be 
used by people making hiring decisions if they had access to it, as 
well as for research examining the boundary conditions under 
which such information would be used.25 
 
 
 19. Blanck & Marti, supra note 11. 
 20. Joseph S. Alper, Genetic Complexity in Human Disease and Behavior, in THE 
DOUBLE-EDGED HELIX: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 17, 
21 (Joseph S. Alper et al. eds., 2002). 
 21. Cunningham-Burley & Boulton, supra note 3; supra text accompanying 
note 14. 
 22. See infra Part III.  
 23. See infra Part IV.  
 24. See infra Part V.  
 25. See infra Part VI.  
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III. WHY STUDY THE POTENTIAL FOR GENETIC DISCRIMINATION—
LEGAL ISSUES AND EXAMPLES OF ACTUAL GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 
A. Legislative and Judicial Response 
The legal community has recognized the potential for genetic 
discrimination in employment.  Psycho-legal scholars26 believe that 
there is insufficient legislation to protect against genetic 
discrimination in employment.  Legal scholars have not yet reached 
a consensus.  Some argue that legislation aimed specifically at the 
problem of genetic discrimination,27 and legislation aimed 
generally at the problem of disability discrimination,28 should 
address the potential problem of genetic discrimination.29  Other 
legal scholars disagree about the adequacy of the legislation,30 as 
Executive Order 13,14531 applies only to federal employees and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not explicitly cover 
presymptomatic individuals, such as those with a genetic 
predisposition but not yet a full-blown disorder. 
 
 26. E.g., Wiesenthal & Wiener, supra note 1; Yoon et al., supra note 10; Blanck 
& Marti, supra note 11; Nance et al., supra note 18. 
 27. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000); National 
Human Genome Research Institute, Policy and Legislation Database, 
http://www.genome.gov/PolicyEthics/LegDatabase/pubsearch.cfm (containing 
various state laws passed specifically to deal with genetic discrimination).  See 
Benjamin V. Carnovale & Mark S. Clanton, Genetic Testing: Issues Related to Privacy, 
Employment and Health Insurance, 10 CANCER PRACTICE 102, 102-04 (2002) (noting 
that even though state legislation addresses the impermissibility of requesting 
genetic tests it is not clear whether requesting information about prior genetic 
tests is prohibited). 
 28. E.g., Americans with Disabilities Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 
(2000). 
 29. See, e.g., Paul S. Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 189 (1998) (discussing the fears of genetic discrimination and the existing 
case law and legislation in place to accommodate it); Paul S. Miller, Is There a Pink 
Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 
225 (2000) (discussing the fears of genetic discrimination, genetic privacy, and the 
existing case law and legislation in place to accommodate both, including an 
executive order by the President). 
 30. See, e.g., Peter D. Blanck & Mollie W. Marti, Attitudes, Behavior, and the 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345 
(1997) (discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act and its effects since 
implementation); Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, 
29 AM. J.L. & MED. 77 (2003) (discussing the differences between genetic 
discrimination and other discrimination and whether genetic discrimination is 
especially derogating). 
 31. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000). 
7
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Indeed, recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have 
interpreted the ADA in a way that some critics consider narrow and 
likely to substantially limit plaintiffs’ ability to bring actions.  For 
example, in one trilogy of cases, the Court made it clear that if a 
plaintiff has taken action to mitigate a disability, then such 
mitigation is to be considered by the courts, and the courts can 
reasonably conclude that plaintiffs are not “substantially limited in 
a major life activity.”32  This would then mean that they are not 
disabled under the ADA.33  Yet another trilogy of recent cases from 
the Supreme Court has continued in the same vein of making it 
difficult for plaintiffs to bring and succeed with ADA claims, either 
by showing (1) they have a disability within the meaning of the 
ADA,34 (2) their request for reasonable accommodation should not 
be subordinate to employer policies,35 or (3) their employer is 
using their own disability against them.36 
These rulings, and others by the Supreme Court, have served 
to limit the applicable scope of the ADA and suggest that the Court 
may be reticent to recognize the applicability of the Act to genetic 
 
 32. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, The ADA and the Workplace: A Study of the Supreme 
Court’s Disabling Choices and Decisions, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 379, 401 (2004) 
(quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)). 
 33. See, e.g., Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567-68 (1999) 
(holding that a plaintiff with amblyopia fired for not meeting Department of 
Transportation vision standards was not disabled by his condition since his visual 
system provided mitigation by allowing him to see with one eye whereas others 
typically see with two eyes); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 
523 (1999) (holding that a plaintiff with hypertension who was denied a position 
driving a commercial vehicle for UPS because he failed Department of 
Transportation certification standards, regarding high blood pressure, was not 
disabled since medication controlled the condition); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493 (1999) (holding that plaintiffs who were denied 
commercial airline pilot positions and who had myopia that could be corrected 
with lenses were not disabled). 
 34. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 202 (2002) 
(holding that a plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who, among other things, 
could not always dress herself and had to limit time spent with her children was 
not sufficiently restricted in major life activities so as to be disabled). 
 35. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 424 (2002) (holding it 
acceptable for an employer’s seniority rules to permit other employees to bid for a 
position that the plaintiff had obtained using his seniority rights to accommodate 
his injury). 
 36. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 87 (2002) (holding that it 
was not impermissible discriminatory action for a contractor to lay off an 
employee whose condition made it likely that working for the contractor’s 
employer in the employer’s refinery would expose the plaintiff to toxins 
exacerbating the plaintiff’s health condition). 
8
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discrimination.  However, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (E.E.O.C.) has interpreted the ADA to apply to 
genetic discrimination, so the potential for courts to adopt this 
interpretation and apply the ADA to presymptomatic individuals 
exists—although it seems unlikely that courts will do so,37 
particularly considering the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
demonstrating that the E.E.O.C.’s interpretations of the ADA will 
not necessarily be followed.  What is apparent is that the problem 
of genetic discrimination has been recognized and that the 
adequacy, or inadequacy, of remedies is being debated. 
Aside from legislation that provides a basis for filing actions 
after discrimination is alleged to occur, there is the potential for 
existing legislation to provide protections that prevent genetic 
information from being acquired in the first place.38  For example, 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
protects the privacy of medical information and prevents disclosure 
of medical information without the patient’s consent.39  However, 
the adequacy of its protections is still being tested, and some 
suggest that there are those who may nonetheless avoid predictive 
testing because of a fear that results will fall into the hands of those 
who would use the information discriminatorily.40  Indeed, during 
hearings related to the reauthorization of the 1996 amendments to 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), panelists raised concerns 
that medical information that could be obtained via credit reports 
or thorough background checks may not be covered by HIPAA.41 
In addition, there are legitimate ways that employers can gain 
access to employee or applicant medical information.  One of the 
most obvious ways is through direct testing of biological materials 
voluntarily turned over by employees (e.g., blood or urine).  
Employees will submit to testing when company policy or law 
 
 37. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (holding that ADA safeguards protecting information on job 
applicant’s medical condition or history are adequate); see also Americans with 
Disabilities Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2000). 
 38. See 42 U.S.C. § 210 (2000). 
 39. Id. 
 40. HIPAA Medical Privacy and Transition Rules: Overkill or Overdue? Hearing 
Before the S. Spec. Comm. On Aging, 108th Cong. 95-97 (2004) (statement of Janlori 
Goldman, Director, Health Privacy Project). 
 41. See HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, SUMMARY OF HEARING ON “THE ROLE OF FCRA 
IN EMPLOYEE BACKGROUND CHECKS AND THE COLLECTION OF MEDICAL INFORMATION” 
1 (2003), http://www.healthprivacy.org/info-url_nocat2303/info-url_nocat_show. 
htm?doc_id=177534. 
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requires it, as in the case of drug testing conducted on employees.  
Drug testing has been upheld by the Supreme Court as permissible 
so long as it is reasonable and there is a “special need,” such as 
when Customs Officers are being promoted to positions where they 
may intercept illegal drug transportation,42 or when public safety 
demands it as with the case of drug testing railway employees.43 
Acquiescence to permissible testing does not, however, mean 
that further testing of the biological materials is necessarily 
allowed.44  Such further testing would include genetic testing, 
which is a separate issue and governed by different legal principles.  
One example of permissible genetic testing involves chemical 
sensitivity.  For example, employers in industries involving 
exposure to beryllium45 may monitor groups of employees via 
genetic testing to make sure that exposure to beryllium will not be 
a health problem for the employees,46 and that the chemical 
exposure is not harming them.47  In the majority of situations, 
however, genetic monitoring and/or testing is impermissible, as 
when employers exceed the scope of permission they have been 
given by employees for testing (e.g., testing for something other 
than drugs or chemical sensitivities).48  Such impermissible testing 
can then predicate employment discrimination by leading to 
decisions not to hire, to fire, or not to promote a given employee 
based on the results of the impermissible tests. 
 
 42. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) 
(holding that Customs Service did not need a warrant to conduct a drug testing 
requirement). 
 43. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 44. See Brian Bornstein, Seize This Urine Test: The Implications of Ferguson v. 
City of Charleston for Drug Testing During Pregnancy, 6 J. MED. & L. 65 (2001) 
(discussing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), which ruled that 
urine tests were searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that 
the tests, along with subsequent reporting of positive results to the police, were 
unreasonable searches absent patients’ consent). 
 45. Beryllium is a lightweight metal to which some people have a genetic 
sensitivity.  Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 949, 
966 n.79 (2001). 
 46. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002); Norman-
Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 47. Marisa Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right 
to Privacy v. Employer’s Need to Know, 39 AM. BUS. L. J. 139, 169-70 (2001) 
(explaining that the Occupation Health and Safety Administration requires an 
employer to protect employees from hazardous chemicals and that employers may 
perform blood tests to determine whether an employee is absorbing harmful levels 
of a chemical). 
 48. See Bornstein, supra note 44. 
10
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B. Actual Genetic/Health-Based Discrimination—Examples and 
Survey Data 
In Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, employees of 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory sued their employer, because they 
found out that blood and urine samples voluntarily submitted 
during standard preemployment and postemployment health 
exams had been tested for sickle cell anemia, pregnancy, and 
syphilis.49  According to the district court, by submitting to routine 
medical exams, and answering questions about such diseases on a 
medical history form, the employees had given permission to test 
for such traits.50  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that 
submission to routine medical exams does not per se amount to 
submission for genetic and pregnancy testing.51 
In another case, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (E.E.O.C.) sued the Burlington Northern and Santa 
Fe Railroad Company after employees found out they were being 
genetically tested for a carpal tunnel syndrome marker.52  The 
company was trying to determine which employees would be likely 
to suffer from repetitive stress injuries, which were becoming a 
financial burden for the company.53  The complaint alleged that 
Burlington Northern even retaliated against employees who 
refused to submit to genetic testing.54  The company ultimately 
agreed to settle out of court.55 
Other anecdotal evidence exists in the form of survey studies 
of patients or workers, which have more pointedly explored the 
issue of perceived discrimination.56  Geller et al. conducted a survey 
through national organizations, which included respondents who 
were at risk, presymptomatic, or asymptomatic for 
hemochromatosis, phenylketonuria, mucopolysaccharidosis 
 
 49. 135 F.3d at 1265. 
 50. Id. at 1266. 
 51. Id. at 1269. 
 52. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., No. 02-C-0456, 2002 WL 32155386, at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2002). 
 53. Id. at *1. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at *2. 
 56. Lisa Geller et al., Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic 
Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis, in THE DOUBLE-EDGED HELIX: SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 247 (2002); E. Virginia Lapham, 
Chahira Kozma & Joan O. Weiss, Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers, 
274 SCI. 621 (1996). 
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disorders, and Huntington disease.57  An initial mailed survey 
screened for people who reported perceived discrimination, and 
follow-up interviews were then conducted with that subsample; of 
the 917 mailed surveys, 206 people were chosen to be interviewed.58  
Respondents identified the institutions that had discriminated 
against them as health and life insurers, clinical professionals, 
employers, blood banks, and public institutions, such as the 
government and military.59 
In addition to asking who was discriminatory, and how, people 
were also asked to indicate if they had taken any steps to avoid 
discrimination.60  Respondents voiced concerns about the 
possibility of discrimination in both hiring and firing.61  Some 
respondents also reported that they refused to accept more 
desirable jobs or relocate for new jobs fearing that health insurance 
would be unobtainable in the new job.62  Thus, although employers 
may not be listed as the most discriminatory, they are clearly linked 
to the group (insurers) that is perceived as the most discriminatory; 
and any discriminatory actions by insurers could affect actions 
taken by employers. 
In order to avoid discrimination, many of the respondents to 
the Geller et al. survey reported taking various actions that gave 
them a sense of control over the situation and their genetic 
information.63  They obtained insurance prior to any genetic 
testing, received testing that could not be linked back to them 
personally, only partially disclosed relevant information, and 
personally paid for testing that would ordinarily be covered by 
insurers (to avoid results of the test falling into the insurers’ 
hands).64  Thus, they not only took passive control (avoidance of 
testing), but active control as well. 
Lapham et al. found results very similar to those of Geller et 
al.65  They also surveyed members of support groups, specifically 
those who were affiliated with the Alliance of Genetic Support 
Groups, and had a total of 332 respondents.  They found that 25% 
 
 57. Geller et al., supra note 56, at 250-52. 
 58. Id. at 251-52. 
 59. Id. at 252. 
 60. Id. at 252, 257. 
 61. Id. at 255. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 257. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Lapham, Kozma & Weiss, supra note 56; Geller et al., supra note 56. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/12
8ADYA_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  9:56:02 AM 
2005] GENETIC INFORMATION AND DISCRIMINATION 277 
of their sample believed they were denied life insurance, 22% 
believed they were denied health insurance, and 13% believed they 
were not hired or were fired all because of their genetic status or 
that of a family member.  They also found that in order to avoid 
being discriminated against, people took steps such as avoiding 
testing (89%) or keeping information from insurers and employers 
(80%). 
Survey data, anecdotal evidence, and some case law suggest 
that genetic discrimination has already occurred.  These sources 
also suggest that both employees and employers have some 
awareness of the existence of technologies like genetic testing and 
the HGP.  The next section reviews data on the extent to which 
laypeople are, in fact, familiar with these concepts. 
 
IV. CURRENT AWARENESS OF THE HGP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS: 
PERCEPTIONS OF TESTING 
The degree to which people are even aware of the availability 
of genetic information could affect its use or the perception that 
such information is being used.  How aware are people of the 
HGP?  How aware are people that genetic tests could be used to 
diagnose their potential for disorders?  How aware are people that 
such information could be used against them, and if they are aware 
of the potential, how fearful are they?  All these questions bear 
examination. 
A. Awareness of the HGP 
Poll data demonstrate that most people indeed are aware of 
the HGP and the concept of genetic testing.  In fall 2001, Virginia 
Commonwealth University conducted a poll of United States 
adults, finding that of the 1122 respondents, roughly half were 
aware of the HGP.66 
A June 2002 Harris Interactive poll67 asked several questions 
 
 66. Va. Commonwealth Univ., Life Sciences Survey, http://roperweb. 
ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/HPOLL/StateId/ 
CqdoZIwcOV0TRW4ZcUBYOFue1VhLm-3XHL/HAHTpage/study_link?STDY_ 
ID=23719 (last visited Oct. 11, 2005). 
 67. HUMPHREY TAYLOR, IF GENETIC TESTS WERE AVAILABLE FOR DISEASES WHICH 
COULD BE TREATED OR PREVENTED, MANY PEOPLE WOULD PAY TO HAVE THEM (2002), 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.Asp?PID=304. 
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about genetics; of 1013 respondents, 70% indicated that they were 
“somewhat familiar” or “very familiar” with the meaning of genetic 
testing, and 81% believed it was a “good thing” to be able to use 
such testing to find out which diseases people were at high risk of 
getting.  In order to find out such information, of course, people 
would need access to someone in the medical field who could 
conduct such testing; 90% of Harris poll respondents indicated 
that they would feel comfortable with their regular doctor knowing 
genetic information about them.  Interestingly, only 25% of those 
polled would want their life insurance company to have access to 
genetic information, 39% would allow their health insurance 
company access, and only 17% of those polled would want their 
employer (who would usually be paying for part of the health 
insurance and, thus, technically have access to such information) to 
have access to the results of genetic tests. 
A poll analysis conducted by the Gallup Organization showed 
that “most” Americans did not want their genetic information to 
get into the hands of employers or insurers.68  Both the Harris and 
Gallup polls demonstrated that most people do not want employers 
to have access to genetic information; it was unclear if this desire is 
due to a fear that the information will result in discrimination, but 
the data is certainly consistent with that notion. 
B. Perceptions of Testing 
Cunningham-Burley and Boulton69 approached the issue of 
using genetic information from a different angle.  By examining 
the lay response to new genetic technology, such as the ability to 
screen for various genetic predispositions to disease, they found 
that people were slow to incorporate the new technologies into 
their lives by making use of the screenings.  One reason posited for 
this finding was that people want to avoid the psychological 
consequences of “knowing”; in other words, people may fear 
having to live with the knowledge that they could become 
symptomatic, so they engage in avoidant behavior.  If this 
assumption is true, it means that people place a lot of weight on the 
predictive power of a genetic test.  In a hiring context, this means 
that an employer might be as likely to discriminate against a person 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Cunningham-Burley & Boulton, supra note 3, at 179-80.  Compare 
Wiesenthal, supra note 1, with Alper, supra note 20. 
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with a predisposition for a disability as she would be to discriminate 
against a person with an actual disability. 
The medical, genetic therapy, and genetic counseling 
literature presents examples of patients’ fear of genetic testing.  In 
a survey of physicians who had requested information on a genetic 
test for breast cancer, Cho et al.70 found that 70% of physicians who 
offered the genetic test had at least one patient who refused to take 
it.  The physicians reported that 68% of patients declining the test 
did so out of fear that confidentiality would not be maintained, 
52% feared the actual results of the test, and 42% did not think 
they could afford it. 
In a review of the literature on genetic testing, Lerman et al.71 
examined three different types of genetic testing: prenatal genetic 
testing (which tests the fetus), carrier testing (which tests parents 
for autosomal recessive traits that require the “defective” gene to be 
inherited from both parents in order for the trait to be expressed), 
and predictive genetic testing (which focuses on the participant’s 
own risk).  They concluded that, although research did not reveal 
broad adverse psychological effects of choosing to have tests, 
subgroups of people with certain psychological traits appeared to 
be more vulnerable to psychological stress than others.  For 
example, they found that women with “information-seeking” 
coping styles were more susceptible to negative effects in some 
situations.  Indeed, research seems to be moving toward identifying 
vulnerable subgroups rather than focusing on the possibility that 
everyone who considers genetic testing may be adversely affected; 
for example, the Multidimensional Impact of Cancer Risk 
Assessment (MICRA) identifies subgroups of people who choose to 
be genetically tested for cancer risk and may be vulnerable to 
psychological distress after learning their test results.72 
Yet another complicating factor of the use of predictive 
genetic test information by applicants, employees, or employers 
involves the effect of individual difference variables like gender.73  
 
 70. Cho et al., supra note 9, at 160. 
 71. Caryn Lerman et al., Genetic Testing: Psychological Aspects and Implications, 
70 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 784 (2002). 
 72. David Cella & Chanita Hughes, A Brief Assessment of Concerns Associated with 
Genetic Testing for Cancer: The Multidimensional Impact of Cancer Risk Assessment 
(MICRA) Questionnaire, 21 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 564 (2002). 
 73. Miller, supra note 29, at 191 (regarding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
“genetic discrimination may have a disparate impact based on race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin”). 
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Two studies have indicated a potential gender effect.  Harman74 
examined attitudes about the use of genetic information and 
genetic engineering, finding that women were less likely than men 
to want genetic tests and enhancements.  Napolitano and 
Ogunseitan75 found similar results when examining gender 
differences in attitudes toward genetic engineering in the area of 
reproduction.  They replicated Harman’s findings that women are 
more cautious than men, with women less accepting of genetic 
engineering as a legitimate way to alter characteristics of unborn 
children in utero.  This suggests that gender may be a moderating 
variable that affects the interpretation and use of genetic 
information.  Thus, male employees might be more likely than 
female employees to submit to genetic testing.  From an employer’s 
perspective, men making hiring decisions might react differently 
than women to applicants who have tested positive for a genetic 
predisposition to disease.  Research examining genetic 
discrimination, perceived and actual, would benefit from 
moderating analyses that examine gender and other individual 
difference variables. 
In an examination of participants’ reasons for and against 
genetic testing, Wroe et al76 investigated in more detail how people 
felt about taking genetic tests.  More specifically, they asked 
participants to predict their likelihood of developing given 
diseases, the likelihood that they would take genetic tests for those 
diseases, and the reasons for their decisions.  Despite being given 
population base rates (e.g., “4% of people develop Disease X”) 77 
for various diseases, all participants overestimated their risk of 
developing diseases.78  Students reported likelihoods of having 
genetic tests from 28% to 62% for a variety of diseases, reflecting 
the ratio between the pros and cons that they listed.79  Diseases that 
student participants were more likely to obtain genetic tests for 
 
 74. Laurinda Beebe Harman, Attitudes About the Use of Genetic Information and 
Genetic Engineering When Making Reproductive Decisions: Influence of Gender, Discipline 
and Role, 55 (8-B) DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 3122 (1995). 
 75. Carol L. Napolitano & Oladele A. Ogunseitan, Gender Differences in the 
Perception of Genetic Engineering Applied to Human Reproduction, 46 SOC. INDICATORS 
RES. 191 (1999). 
 76. Abigail L. Wroe et al., The Prospect of Predictive Testing for Personal Risk: 
Attitudes and Decision Making, 36 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 599 (1998). 
 77. Id. at 605-06. 
 78. Id. at 607. 
 79. Id. at 607-09. 
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included diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, heart disease, weak bones, 
and breast cancer (with likelihoods greater than 50%), and diseases 
that student participants were less likely to obtain genetic tests for 
included colon cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, and schizophrenia 
(with likelihoods of less than 50%).80  Another group of 
participants, one that identified itself as having contemplated 
genetic testing in the past, reported higher likelihoods of obtaining 
genetic tests, ranging from 56% to 84% across a variety of 
diseases.81 
The predictability of one’s likelihood to take a genetic test, 
however, is more complex than this account indicates.  In a review 
of decision-making studies dealing with genetic risks and tests, 
Shiloh82 presented many examples of contradictory findings.  
Decisions varied according to several factors, including when the 
studies were conducted; how the risk was presented to participants; 
how researchers operationalized or framed the “decision” that 
participants had to make; and who was asked to make the decision 
about genetic tests (e.g., patients versus parents, spouses, families, 
and different cultural groups).83  It has been shown that one’s role 
affects one’s perspective when making decisions,84 as does 
framing.85  Additional research suggests that certainty in the 
predictability of genetic tests is important,86 as is the control one 
has over the progression of the disease at issue.87 Clearly, the 
picture is a complex one, and findings need to be interpreted 
within the context of how the research was conducted. 
 
 80. Id. at 608. 
 81. Id. at 609. 
 82. Shoshana Shiloh, Decision-Making in the Context of Genetic Risk, in THE 
TROUBLED HELIX: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW HUMAN 
GENETICS 82 (Theresa Marteau & Martin Richards eds., 1996). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Willem A. Wagenaar & Gideon B. Keren, The Seat Belt Paradox: 
Effect of Adopted Roles on Information Seeking, 38(1) ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 1 (1986). 
 85. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky eds., 2000); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2004).  
 86. See generally Bettina Meiser et al., Implications of Genetic Risk Information in 
Families with a High Density of Bipolar Disorder: An Exploratory Study, 60(1) SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 109. (2004); Shoshana Shiloh et al., Effects of Controllability, Predictability, and 
Information-Seeking Style on Interest in Predictive Genetic Testing, 25(10) PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1187 (1999). 
 87. See generally Shiloh, supra note 82. 
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V. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON DISABILITY AND DISCRIMINATION 
Psycho-legal writers have convincingly demonstrated the 
potential for genetic discrimination; however, experimental 
examination of the phenomenon is lacking.  In order to better 
understand how genetic test information might be used 
discriminatorily, it is instructive to look at the related literature on 
discrimination due to disability.  This well-developed body of 
literature not only shows how discrimination occurs, but also 
suggests important variables to consider and methodologies to use 
in the study of discrimination. 
Statistical data suggests that the disabled are treated 
inequitably in the job market, as evidenced by a comparison of the 
employment and pay rates of disabled and non-disabled 
individuals.  The salaries of the working disabled are up to 35% 
lower than those who are in the same jobs and not disabled.88  
According to the Department of Labor, the disparity is caused in 
large part by employers’ stereotypes and attitudes toward the 
disabled89 and by employers’ expectations that disabled employees 
will contribute to higher bottom-line costs with absenteeism, 
poorer performance, turnover, accommodation necessities,90 lower 
productivity, and higher workers’ compensation rates.91  Based on 
the aforementioned concerns, it would seem that employers take 
two different measures to combat the supposed higher costs of 
employing disabled people: not hiring the disabled in the first 
place or paying them less. 
According to Stone and Colella,92 perception of disabled 
people begins with their immediate categorization.  Categories 
automatically bring to mind stereotypes of the disabled and 
associated expectancies with those stereotypes.93  For example, 
 
 88. Dianna L. Stone & Adrienne Colella, A Model of Factors Affecting the 
Treatment of Disabled Individuals in Organizations, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 352, 352 
(1996) (citing FRANK BOWE, ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES: A PORTRAIT (1992)). 
 89. David Braddock & Lynn Bachelder, The Glass Ceiling and Persons with 
Disabilities, 56 PUB. POL’Y MONOGRAPH SERIES 1 (1994). 
 90. Stone & Colella, supra note 88, at 352-53 (citing DAVID BRADDOCK & LYNN 
BACHELDER, THE GLASS CEILING AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (1994)). 
 91. See also Dale R. Fuqua et al., A Comparison of Employer Attitudes Toward the 
Worker Problems of Eight Types of Disabled Workers, 15 J. APPLIED REHAB. COUNSELING 
40, 41 (1984) (discussing employer attitudes towards productivity, accident rates, 
and worker compensation problems). 
 92. Stone & Colella, supra note 88, at 358. 
 93. Id. 
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Fichten and Amsel94 found that the physically disabled are 
perceived as “quiet, honest, gentle hearted, non-egotistical, 
benevolent, helpless, hypersensitive, inferior, depressed, distant, 
shy, unappealing, unsociable, bitter, nervous, unaggressive, 
insecure, dependent, unhappy, aloof, and submissive” more often 
than non-disabled people. 
Despite these broad stereotypes, not all disabilities are viewed 
in the same way.  The majority of the evidence appears to 
demonstrate that sensory disabilities (e.g., blindness and deafness) 
and cognitive disabilities (e.g., mental retardation and mental 
illness) are viewed less favorably than physical disabilities.95 
It has been suggested that the reason for the difference in how 
sensory and cognitive impairments are viewed, as compared to 
physical impairments, lies in the fact that physical impairments are 
seen as more consistent and predictable over time.96  Following 
from that, it may be that genetic tests that are positive for mental 
disabilities may also be seen as less stable and predictable than 
genetic tests that are positive for physical disabilities.  Conversely, if 
people are attuned to the fact that genetic tests are not 
determinative, then they may see positive genetic tests for any 
disorder as analogous to an actual mental disability: unstable over 
time and unpredictable. 
Research examining disabled people in the workplace has not 
just looked at whether disabled people are perceived differently, but 
also whether they are treated differently.  Analog research models 
 
 94. Id. (citing Catherine S. Fichten & Rhonda Amsel, Trait Attributions about 
College Students with a Physical Disability: Circumplex Analyses and Methodological Issues, 
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL., 16:410-27 (1986)). 
 95. James E. Bordieri & David E. Drehmer, Hiring Decisions for Disabled 
Workers: Looking at the Cause, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 197, 204 (1986) (finding 
that potential employers viewed job applicants with paraplegia more favorably 
than applicants with drug-related problems); David E. Drehmer & James E. 
Bordieri, Hiring Decisions for Disabled Workers: The Hidden Bias, 30 REHAB. PSYCHOL. 
157, 157 (1985) (finding that potential employers viewed job applicants with a 
history of mental illness less favorably than applicants with paraplegia); Fuqua et 
al., supra note 91, at 41-42 (finding that potential employers favored epileptics and 
amputees over the blind and mentally retarded.); Jean-Francois Ravaud et al., 
Discrimination Towards Disabled People Seeking Employment, 35 SOC. SCI. MED. 951 
(1992) (finding that potential employers viewed job applicants with paraplegia less 
favorably than applicants without paraplegia).  But see Bradford S. Bell & 
Katherine J. Klein, Effects of Disability, Gender, and Job Level on Ratings of Job 
Applicants, 46 REHAB. PSYCHOL. 229, 238-39 (2001) (finding bias in favor of job 
applicants with disabilities). 
 96. Fuqua, supra note 91, at 41. 
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have determined that disabled applicants receive fewer callbacks 
for interviews,97 less favorable hiring recommendations,98 lower 
salary recommendations,99 and that they are generally rated lower 
than non-disabled applicants along a variety of dimensions such as 
competence.100  Consistent with the stereotype research, individuals 
with physical disabilities are discriminated against less in the 
employment context than those with mental or neurological 
disabilities.101  In 1979, Rose and Brief102 examined the differences 
in hiring rates and other employment-related treatment between 
epileptics and the physically disabled (e.g., paraplegics and 
amputees).  They found that amputees were offered lower salaries 
than non-disabled people and that epileptics were offered lower 
salaries than the amputees.  Stone and Sawatzki103 compared groups 
of applicants who were non-disabled, physically disabled, and 
psychiatrically disabled.  They found no differences between the 
non-disabled and physically disabled in terms of the probability of 
being hired, but they did find that the group of applicants with 
psychiatric disabilities fared worse. This result has been replicated 
elsewhere104 and occurs even when participants rate the physically 
and mentally disabled as having equivalent work qualifications.105  
In general, unfavorable information about a job applicant is given 
greater weight than other information,106 and it appears that a 
disability is clearly perceived as unfavorable information.  
Disabilities, along with ethnicity and gender, are one of the 
 
 97. Ravaud et al., supra note 95, at 954. 
 98. Christopher I. Stone & Birgit Sawatzki, Hiring Bias and the Disabled 
Interviewee: Effects of Manipulating Work History and Disability Information of the 
Disabled Job Applicant, 16 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 96, 101 (1980). 
 99. Gerald L. Rose & Arthur P. Brief, Effects of Handicap and Job Characteristics 
on Selection Evaluations, 32 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 385, 388-89 (1979). 
 100. Bell & Klein, supra note 95. 
 101. See generally Stone & Colella, supra note 90. 
 102. Rose & Brief, supra note 99. 
 103. Stone & Sawatzki, supra note 98. 
 104. See, e.g., William Drew Gouvier et al., Employment Discrimination Against 
Handicapped Job Candidates: An Analog Study of the Effects of Neurological Causation, 
Visibility of Handicap, and Public Contact, 36 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 121 (1991) 
(discussing employer perceptions of disabled potential employees); Linda T. 
Thomas & James E. Thomas, The Effects of Handicap, Sex, and Competence On Expected 
Performance, Hiring and Salary Recommendations, 16 J. APPLIED REHABILITATION  
COUNSELING 19 (1985) (discussing current trends in employer attitudes towards 
hiring). 
 105. Bordieri & Drehmer, supra note 95. 
 106. Patricia M. Rowe, Decision Processes in Personnel Selection, 16 CAN. J. BEHAV. 
SCI. 326 (1984) (reviewing research on decision-making in personnel selection). 
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“stigmas in organizations.”107 
The literature on disability discrimination is instructive 
because people may perceive a positive genetic test (i.e., the 
potential for disability) to be “as good as” having a disability.  The 
literature on perceptions of predictive genetic testing and the 
likelihood of having genetic tests indicates that this may be the 
case, since fear of the results suggests an overly deterministic 
interpretation of a positive genetic test.  Thus, if genetic 
information is given great weight, it could lead to discrimination 
against people with positive results by operating much the same 
way that having an actual disability does.  It would be interesting to 
see how closely the perceptions match by determining whether a 
person with a positive genetic test for higher risk of a mental 
disability (e.g., depression) is discriminated against more often 
than a person with a positive genetic test for higher risk of a 
physical disability (e.g., carpal tunnel syndrome).  Such a finding 
would show that people perceive the potential for different 
disabilities in the same way they perceive actual different 
disabilities. 
Thus, if one has the option of hiring someone who has tested 
positive for high risk of a disease over someone who has not tested 
positive—and the person who has tested positive is equally qualified 
for the job—it seems likely that the person who did not test positive 
would be hired.  In such a case, the hiring decision would be 
discriminatory.  Should it be demonstrated that such 
discriminatory decisions are made, the calls for legislation 
protecting those who test positive for genetic disorders would have 
more force than they do currently, in the absence of research. 
VI. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: WHAT DO PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 
HAVE TO OFFER? 
Clearly, the bulk of the literature supports the notion that 
genetic discrimination is a potential problem.  What can 
psychology and law offer to address this problem?  “Social analytic 
jurisprudence” provides a framework for studying the interaction of 
 
 107. Eugene F. Stone et al., Stigmas in Organizations: Race, Handicaps, and 
Physical Unattractiveness, in ISSUES, THEORY, AND RESEARCH IN 
INDUSTRIAL/ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 385 (Kathryn Kelley ed., North-Holland 
1992). 
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law and social science, especially psychology,108 which can be 
applied to the topic of genetic discrimination.  The first stage in 
the approach is analysis of doctrine, policy rules, or legal 
procedures, carefully looking for assumptions that the law makes 
about human behavior.  With respect to genetic discrimination, 
there are clear indications of concern that employers could misuse 
genetic information if it is available.109 
The second stage of social analytic jurisprudence is a careful 
psychological analysis of law and policy, in which the psycho-legal 
scholar identifies the theories, research results, and methodologies 
that are most suitable to answer legal and policy questions.110  
Research documenting the consistency with which genetic 
discrimination could occur can serve as the foundation upon which 
arguments for preventative or punitive legislation are made.  The 
employee selection and disability discrimination literature contains 
numerous examples of analog research in which participants 
simulate the task of employers in making decisions such as hiring 
and salary recommendations.111  This methodology, which provides 
a means of systematically investigating the impact of relevant 
variables (e.g., type of disability) in a controlled fashion, yields 
results that comport well with those of more naturalistic studies.112  
It could easily be adapted to the study of genetic discrimination by 
incorporating a predisposition for a disability (i.e., a positive genetic 
test) instead of an actual disability. 
 
 108. Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do 
Workers Know When It Is Harassment and When It Is Not?, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1997) 
[hereinafter Social Sexual Conduct] (discussing  the psychological implications of 
hostile work environment law); Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, How Do People 
Evaluate Social-Sexual Conduct at Work?: A Psycholegal Model, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
75 (2000) (evaluating social sexual conduct complaints with reasonable person 
and reasonable woman legal standard); Richard L. Wiener et al., The Fit and 
Implementation of Sexual Harassment Law to Workplace Evaluations, 87 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 747 (2002) (examining legal standards on the evaluation of social-sexual 
conduct at work); Richard L. Wiener et al., The Effects of Prior Workplace Behavior on 
Subsequent Sexual Harassment Judgments, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 47 (2004) (testing 
dual processing model of sexual harassment judgments). 
 109. E.g., Walker & Diforio, supra note 16; Yoon, supra note 10. 
 110. Social Sexual Conduct, supra note 108, at 55. 
 111. E.g., Bell & Klein, supra note 95; Bordieri & Drehmer, supra note 95; 
Michael A. Hitt & Steven H. Barr, Managerial Selection Decision Models: Examination 
of Configural Cue Processing, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 53 (1989) (evaluating hiring 
possibilities based on age, sex, race, education, and experience); Rose & Brief, 
supra note 99; Stone & Sawatzki, supra note 98. 
 112. Ravaud et al., supra note 95. 
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The disability discrimination literature generally follows the 
analog paradigm in which student samples are given descriptions of 
jobs and told that their task is to review applicant material and 
select someone for the position.  Factors such as the disability of 
the applicant, the nature of the disability, and the nature of the job 
are frequently manipulated variables. 
There are, however, examples of studies on disability 
discrimination that are notable for being more realistically 
designed.  Ravaud et al.113 conducted a field study in which a 
representative, stratified sample of 2228 French companies’ 
different branches were mailed application materials.  The 
researchers manipulated the type of disability, as well as the job 
qualification of the applicants, and their dependent measure was 
the number of callbacks for interviews that the applicants received.  
When analyzing their results in a weighted manner such that 
company size was accounted for, they found that disability did have 
a negative effect on the number of callbacks received and that 
larger companies discriminated more than smaller companies.  
Thus, both analog and field studies demonstrate discrimination 
toward people with disabilities. 
The third stage of social analytic jurisprudence follows directly 
from the first two.  A psycho-legal analysis of the knowledge base 
related to an area of law or public policy, such as genetic 
discrimination and the HGP, is likely to point out gaps in our 
understanding of the psychological and social realities that 
underlie legal assumptions.  “In the third stage of social analytic 
jurisprudence, psycho-legal scholars conduct research that tests the 
psychological . . . models that they applied to answer the empirical 
issues identified in stages 1 and 2.”114  It is at this stage that the topic 
of genetic discrimination affords numerous empirical avenues.  For 
example, to what extent do employers rely on genetic information?  
How do they use this information relative to other health 
information (e.g., family history) or job-relevant information (e.g., 
work experience)?  Is the information used more in some types of 
employment decisions than others (e.g., hiring decisions versus. 
post-hiring decisions like personnel evaluations)?  Does reliance on 
genetic information vary as a function of individual characteristics 
(e.g., decision makers’ race, gender, or job position), company 
 
 113. See id. 
 114. Social Sexual Conduct, supra note 108, at 72. 
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characteristics (e.g., size), or type of genetic information (e.g., 
predisposition for a mental versus. a physical disability)? Do 
organizational policies effectively prevent the use of such 
information when salient?  Experimental psychological research 
that manipulates some of these variables within a simulated 
employment context could provide a wealth of information on 
whether legal assumptions about genetic discrimination are 
warranted. 
In addition to influencing policy, social science research on 
the law can measure law’s impact on the behavior of citizens.115  If 
people fear—as research suggests they do116—that employers and 
others would use the results of such screenings to discriminate 
against them, they might avoid predictive screening (and thus miss 
the opportunity for early diagnosis and treatment) altogether, 
which it has been suggested might occur117 or already is 
occurring.118  It is important to assess whether such discrimination 
is in fact taking place.  Aside from preventing discrimination in the 
event that it is occurring, protective legislation could help allay 
people’s fears even if it is not occurring. 
 
 
 115. Id. at 74. 
 116. E.g., Hellman, supra note 30. 
 117. See 42 U.S.C. § 210 (2000). 
 118. Geller et al., supra note 56, at 247; Lapham et al., supra note 56, at 621. 
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